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The Equal Opportunities and Fairness
Doctrines in Broadcasting: Should
They Be Retained?
By ROSCOE L. BARROW
Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
Director, Network Study Staff, FCC, 1955-57; Consultant, Office of Com-
missioners, FCC, 1961-63; Moderator, Hearings on the Fairness Doctrine,
Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 1968.
T HE SUBCOMMITTEE on Communications of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce is holding hearings
for the purpose of rewriting the Communications Act of 1934,1 and
the Subcommittee on Communications of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation is conducting hearings on
important aspects of communications. An important question under
consideration is whether the Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doc-
trines applicable to broadcasting should be retained.2 This article
assesses the merit of these doctrines in our representative democracy
today.
1. The Policy Basis for the Equal Opportunities
and Fairness Doctrines
The Supreme Court has observed that, in licensing and regulating
broadcasting, "Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear
that in the absence of governmental control the public interest might
be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting field."3
This concern was first aroused by the advent of chain broadcasting,
the forerunner of today's nationwide networks. Herbert Hoover, at the
Third Annual Radio Conference in 1924, warned:
1. Options Papers prepared by the Staff for use by the Subcommittee on Communi-
cations of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, House of Representatives,
95th Cong., 1st sess., Committee Print 95-13 (May 1977).
2. Id. at 65-80. House Subcommittee on Communications, Broadcast Panel Dis-
cussions, Tentative Schedule, June 29, 1977.
3. FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940).
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[T]he greatest advance in radio since our last conference is the com-
plete demonstration of the feasibility of interconnection [of a chain
of radio stations]. It is our duty to consider the possibilities and
potentialities of interconnection. . . . It would be unfortunate, in-
deed, if such an important function as the distribution of informa-
tion should ever fall into the hands of Government. It would be
still more unfortunate if its control should come under the arbitrary
power of any person or group of persons. 'It is inconceivable that
such a situation could be allowed to exist. . . .
The concern over the power of chain broadcasting to control public
opinion and political elections was also expressed in the congressional
debates which led to the Radio Act of 1927.; Illustrative is the state-
ment of Congressman Johnson:
The power of the press will not be comparable to that of broad-
casting stations when the industry is fully developed. . .. [I]t will
only be a few years before these broadcasting stations, if operated
by chain stations, will simultaneously . . . bring messages to the
fireside of nearly every home in America. They can mold and crys-
tallize sentiment as no agency in the past has been able to do. If
the strong arm of the law does not prevent monopoly ownership
and make discrimination by such stations illegal, American thought
and American politics will be largely at the mercy of those who
operate these stations.'
To guard against control of public opinion and political elections
by broadcasting networks and stations, Congress has enacted several
safeguards. The broadcasting channels are a public domain, with
ownership of them vested in the people of the United States.7 Broad-
casters are licensed to use the channels for a limited term of three
years, subject to renewal if the public interest has been served., And
broadcasters are required to provide opposing political candidates with
equal opportunities to use broadcasting facilities for political purposes.
4. Address by Herbert Hoover, Third Annual Radio Conference, 1924, quoted in
FCC, OFFICE OF NETWORK STUDY, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, Docket No. 12782, at 114
(1965).
5. Act of Feb. 23, 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162.
6. 67 CONG. REc. 5558 (1926).
7. Congress stated that the purpose of the Act is "to maintain control of the United
States over all the channels . . . and to provide for the use of the channels, but not for
the ownership thereof." 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1970). The Act requires licensees to waive
expressly any right in the assigned frequency, which is normally for a three year term.
Id.,§§ 304,, 307(d), 309 (1970 & Supp. 1974). The Supreme Court has recognized that
the electromagnetic spectrum is a natural resource and public domain, the ownership
of which is vested in the people of the United States. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.
v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 173-74 (1972).
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307, 309 (1970).
9. This provision was enacted as section 18 of the Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44
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In 1929, two years after Congress enacted this doctrine, the Federal
Radio Commission (the predecessor to the FCC) applied the under-\
lying fairness principle to "all discussions of issues of importance to
the public."1o Twenty years later, the significance of the Fairness Doc-
trine in broadcast of controversial issues of public importance was
articulated in the FCC's 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees as follows:
It is axiomatic that one of the most vital questions of mass com-
munication in a democracy is the development of an -informed
public opinion through the public dissemination of news and ideas
concerning the vital public issues of the day. . . . The Commission
has consequently recognized the necessity for licensees to devote
a reasonable percentage of their broadcast time to the presentation
of news and programs devoted to the consideration and discussion
of public issues of interest in the community served by the partic-
ular 'station. And we have recognized, with respect to such pro-
grams, the paramount right of the public in a free society to be
informed and to have presented to it for acceptance or rejection
the different attitudes and viewpoints concerning these vital and
often controversial issues which are held by the various groups
which make up the community. It is the right of ,the public to: be
informed, rather than any right on the part of the Government, any
broadcast licensee or any individual member of the public to broad-
cast his own particular views on any matter, which is the foundation
stone of the American system of broadcasting."
It is to be noted that under the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters have
an affirmative duty to allocate reasonable time to the broadcast of
controversial issues of public importance and to allocate reasonable
time to both sides of such issues. In 1959, Congress, in amending
section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934, ratified the Fairness
Doctrine.1 2
The policy on which regulation of broadcasting is based is the
requirement that the licensees of the publicly owned channels serve
the public interest.1 3 In the Ashbacker case," the Supreme Court held
that the FCC must provide a comparative hearing in which the best
Stat. 1170, and was reenacted as section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934. 47
U.S.C. § 315 (1970 & Supp. 1974).
10. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. ANN. REP. 32, 33 (1929).
11. Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1249 (1949). For a re-
cent statement of the Fairness Doctrine, see FCC Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest
Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372, 26,374 (1974).
12. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-82 (1969).
13. See supra note 8.
14. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327 (1945).
67
qualified of competing applicants is chosen to serve the public interest.
The nature of the electromagnetic spectrum is such that channels are
limited and the licensee is granted a monopoly use of the channel for
a term. Having excluded the many who desire to broadcast, the few
who are granted licenses to broadcast are required to serve the public
interest. Since commercial broadcasting is a mass marketing instru-
ment, networks select programming which fulfills the need of the mass
advertisers. Low brow entertainment, rather than programs involving
controversial issues, is the proven vehicle for carrying advertising hav-
ing sales impact. Accordingly, the licensees are placed under an affirm-
ative duty to make a reasonable effort to ascertain and to fulfill the
program needs of the people reached by the signal."' The FCC is
granted the power to implement the public interest standard through
adjudication, rule making, and policy statements.'
The capsheaf of the public interest standard is the right of the
people to be informed through broadcasting regarding political cam-
paigns and controversial issues of public importance. The Equal Op-
portunities and Fairness Doctrines in broadcasting are designed to
inform the electorate and, thus, to encourage our people to participate
responsibly in representative democracy.
2. The Constitutional Basis for the Equal Opportunities
and Fairness Doctrines
The electronic media are subject to regulation but the print media
are not. The soundness of this double standard is being questioned."
This section- reviews the Supreme Court's reasoning in holding that
governmental regulation is compatible with freedom of speech and
press of broadcasters but contravenes freedom of press of publishers
and editors.
In National Broadcasting Co. v. United States,'8 the Supreme Court
held that the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Rules do not contravene the
free speech of the broadcasters. The rules prohibit the licensing of
broadcasters whose network affiliation contracts include provisions -
such as time optioning - which inhibit broadcasters in their choice of
programming to fulfill the needs of the community served.' 9
15. En Banc Programming Inquiry, 20 RAMro REG. 1901 (1960).
16. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970 & Supp. 1974).
17. See supra note 2.
18. 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
19. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658 (1973).
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At the three judge trial court level, Judge Learned Hand wrote on
the free speech issue:
The Commission does, therefore, coerce their [the, broadcasters]
choice and their freedom and perhaps, if the public intereit in
whose name this was done were other than the interest in free
speech itself, we should have a problem under the first amendment;
we might have to say whether the interest protected, however vital,
could stand against the constitutional right. But that is not the case.
The interests which the [Chain Broadcasting] regulations seek to
protect are the very interests which the first amendment itself pro-
tects, i.e., the interests, first of the 'listeners', next of any licensees
who may prefer to be freer of the 'networks' than they are, and
last, of any future competing 'networks'. Whether or not the con-
flict between these interests and those of the 'networks' and their
'affiliates' has been properly composed, no question of free speech
can arise.2o
In the quoted passage, Judge Hand taught us that, in applying the
first amendment to broadcasting, regulation in aid of free speech does
not contravene freedom of speech or press, and that, in the accommo-
dation of first amendment interests in broadcasting, the interest of
the listeners and viewers is more important than the interest of the
broadcasters and networks.
In affirming the lower court in NBC, Justice Frankfurter, for the
Supreme Court, wrote:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the
limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic,
and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation. Because it cannot be used by all, some
who wish to use it must be denied. . . . The right of free speech
does not include, however, the right to use the facilities of radio
without a license.2 1
Justice Frankfurter's reasoning is that, since the physical limitations
of the radio spectrum restrict grant of licenses to only a small part
of those who desire to broadcast, those who receive the privilege accept
it with the obligation to serve the interest of the viewers and listeners.
Thus, if the licensee fails in this obligation, the license may be revoked
without contravening the broadcaster's freedom of speech or press.
While Justice Frankfurter does not state that the interest of the
listeners and viewers is paramount in the accommodation of the
20. 47 F. Supp. 940, 946 (emphasis added) (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
21. 319 U.S. 190, 226-27.
69
several first amendment interests in broadcasting, his opinion is com-
patible with Judge Hand's view.
The definitive case by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality
of the Fairness Doctrine, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,22 is based
upon the paramount interest of viewers and listeners in the accom-
modation of first amendment interests in broadcasting as well as upon
the limited number of broadcasting channels.
In the Red Lion case, the Supreme Court had before it two cases
in which different federal courts of appeals had reached conflicting
decisions on the constitutionality of the Fairness Doctrine as applied
in the context of an adjudication arising out of a personal attack during
the presentation of a controversial issue2 3 and judicial review of the
FCC's rules applying the Fairness Doctrine to personal attacks and
political editorials.24 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the Fairness Doctrine against the contention that the Doctrine vio-
lates freedom of speech and press. Justice White, for the Court, wrote:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio
and their collective right to have the medium function consistently
with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right
of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which
is paramount. It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by Government itself or a private licensee.
... [TIhe resource is one . . . for which there are more immediate
and potential uses than can be accommodated, and for which wise
planning is essential.
In view of the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, the Government's
role in allocating those frequencies, and the legitimate claims of
those unable without governmental assistance to gain access to
those frequencies for expression of their views, we hold the regu-
lations and ruling at issue here . . . constitutional.25
In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee,2 6 the Supreme Court again emphasized that the first
amendment interest of broadcasters, and hence networks, must be
22. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
23. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 381 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
24. Radio Television News Directors Ass'n v. United States, 400 F.2d 1002 (7th
Cir. 1968). The personal attack and political editorial rules are found at 47 C.F.R. §§
73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1976).
25. 395 U.S. 367, 390, 399-401 (citations omitted).
26. 412 U.S. 94 (1972).
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accommodated to the paramount first amendment interest of the
viewers and listeners. The issue before the Court was whether there
is a constitutional right of access to broadcasting during paid adver-
tising time for presentation of editorial opinion. Chief Justice Burger
wrote:
Because the broadcast media utilize a valuable and limited public
resource, there is also present an unusual order of First Amendment
values.... Although the broadcaster is not without protection under
the First Amendment, '[i]t is the right of the viewers and listeners,
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. . . .'
Balancing the various First Amendment interests involved in
the broadcast media and determining what best serves the public's
right to be informed is a task of great delicacy and difficulty. The
process must necessarily be undertaken within the regulatory
scheme that has 'evolved over the course of the past half-century.
For, during that time, Congress and its chosen regulatory agency
established a delicately balanced system of regulation intended to
serve the interests of all concerned.2 7
The first amendment interest of listeners and viewers is paramount
regardless of whether the subject matter of the broadcast is journalism,
entertainment or advertising. However, in balancing the first amend-
ment interest of the listeners and viewers with the broadcasters' free-
dom of press, the protection accorded the licensees may vary in degree.
The Supreme Court long took the position that product advertising
is not protected in the degree that communications having idea content
are protected.2 8 In recent cases involving restrictions on advertising
of prices for pharmaceuticals 29 and lawyers' fees,3 0 the Supreme Court
has recognized that advertising has substantial protection under the
first amendment. However, it should be noted that, in these recent
cases, the Court was protecting freedom to communicate information
which the public had a need to know.3 1 Congress has validly prohib-
27. 412 U.S. 94, 101-02 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court held that persons
desiring to present editorial advertisements via broadcasting do not have a right of ac-
cess which is protected by freedom of speech, as Congress and the FCC have provided
for broadcast of public issues through the Fairness Doctrine. However, the Court ob-
served that, if the FCC could devise a practical system for granting access which also
accommodates the several first amendment interests involved, such a system of required
access would not violate the freedom of the press of the licensed broadcasters.
28. E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
29. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 U.S.L.W. 4895 (June 27, 1977).
31. "[A] consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may be
... keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political debate . . . .
When drug prices vary as strikingly as they do, information as to who is charging what
becomes more than a convenience." See supra note 29 at 763-64.
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ited broadcast of product advertising of cigarettes and small cigars. 2
In balancing the first amendment right of listeners and viewers
and freedom of press of broadcasters relative to entertainment pro-
gramming, the Supreme Court would recognize the validity of concerns
as to the impact of excessive violence on the young and impression-
able, while protecting the good faith artistic judgment and discretion
of the licensed broadcasters in selecting programming to fulfill the
needs of listeners and viewers. 3 In CBS v. NBC,3 4 the Supreme Court
emphasized that Congress had vested good faith journalistic judgment
and discretion in the broadcast licensees, subject to fulfilling the right
of the people to know under the Fairness Doctrine. In the balancing
of the first amendment interests of listeners and viewers with the
freedom of press of broadcasters, probably the highest degree of pro-
tection accorded licensed broadcasters is in this area of journalistic
judgment and discretion. However, even in this area, the Supreme
Court has made clear that the first amendment right of the listeners
and viewers is paramount.35
Of course, in any legislative or regulatory area which involves a
balancing of first amendment interests, the means.chosen by Congress
and the regulatory agency will be exarmined to determine whether the
means of achieving the policy is reasonable and does not unnecessarily
impinge upon a first amendment interest. However, in CBS v. NBC,
the Supreme Court emphasized that, due to the sensitivity and com-
plexity of balancing the several first amendment interests in broad-
casting, the means chosen by the Congress and the FCC would be
given great weight in resolving the first amendment issue.30 Thus, the
Court reasoned that, as the FCC had not required broadcasters to
accept paid editorial opinions for broadcast in advertising time, relying
rather on -the Fairness Doctrine to achieve diversity of viewpoints,
broadcasters did not violate a first amendment right in denying access
to paid editorial advertisements; but, if the FCC should devise a prac-
ticable plan for access for paid editorial advertisements, this would
not violate the broadcaster's freedom of the press.
In contrast to broadcasting, the print media are not subject to
governmental regulation of content. In Miami Herald Publishing Co.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970).
33. See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
34. 412 U.S. 94 (1972).
35. Id. at 102.
36. Id. at 117-19.
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v. Tornillo,"7 the United States Supreme Court held that Florida's
statutory right of reply to any political candidate whose character was
attacked during political campaigns violated freedom of the press. The
Florida Supreme Court had reasoned that daily newspapers are scarce,
that there Is a need to accommodate the reader's first amendment
interest with the freedom of press of the publishers and editors, that
the public's need to know is critical during political campaigns, and
that free speech is enhanced rather than abridged by the statute.8
On this reasoning, which closely parallels the reasoning of the Supreme
Court of the United States In upholding governmental regulation of
broadcasting, the Florida Supreme Court held that the statute did not
violate the first amendment. The Supreme Court of the United States,
in reversing the Florida Supreme Court, refused to equate scarcity re-
sulting from economic forces with scarcity inherent in the limitations
of the radio spectrum or to balance the need of the public to know
with the editorial control and judgment of the editors. The Court con-
sidered only the effect of the right-to-reply statute on the,right of the
publishers and editors to determine what to print:
The choice of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions
made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and
treatment of public issues and public officials - whether fair or
unfair - constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.
It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this
crucial process can be exercised consistent with First Amendment
guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time"
There are more than 8,000 radio and television stations and less
than 2,000 daily newspapers.'0 Competition between daily newspapers
in the same city is almost a phenomenon of the past." In light of the
scarcity of daily newspapers, some observers question the soundness
of the Supreme Court's holding that governmental regulation of broad-
casting in the public interest does not infringe freedom of speech and
press while governmental regulation of daily newspapers does violate
freedom of the press. A possible answer is that, contrary to the Supreme
Court's decision, a right-of-reply statute is compatible with the first
amendment. Our constitutional fathers wrote the first amendment
37. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
38. 287 So. 2d 78, 80-85 (Fla. 1973).
39. 418 U.S. at 258.
40. BROADCASTING, 1973 YEARBOOK 12; NEWSPAPEn ENTERPRISE ASSN, WoRzD AL-
MANAC AND Boox or FACTS 323 (1974).
41. B. RUCKER, THE FIRST FREEDOM 8, 10, 21-23 (1968), reviewed Barrow, 15
N.Y.L.F. 999 (1970).
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guarantees of freedom of speech and press in the time of Tom Paine.
Dick and Harry did not need access to Tom's penny sheet because
they could print and distribute their own sheet. Today is the time of
Hearst, Scripps-Howard, Knight, and other newspaper chains. The
Miami Herald case, coupled with the defamation law,42 leaves both
the political candidate who is attacked and, more importantly, the
electorate "at the complete mercy of the press. "4
Those who question the double standard in applying the first
amendment so as to prevent governmental regulation of the print
media while permitting governmental regulation of broadcasting typi-
cally take the position that governmental regulation of broadcasting
violates freedom of speech and press of broadcasters. However, there
are sound distinctions between broadcasting and the print media for
the purpose of the first amendment issue. The broadcasting channels
are owned by the people"4 while newspaper facilities are owned by
the publishers. The broadcasting channels are inherently limited by
the nature of the electromagnetic spectrum while print media are
limited only by the economics of cost. The regulation of broadcasting
in the public interest, notably through the Equal Opportunities and
Fairness Doctrines, does not inhibit free speech, but enhances it.4
Broadcasters are licensed to use the publicly owned channels for a
limited term subject to renewal if the licensee serves the public in-
terest. The licensee is a trustee of the channel and assumes a duty to
use a reasonable effort to ascertain and to fulfill the needs of the people
in the community reached by the signal. Freedom of speech and press
in broadcasting involves interests of broadcasters, networks, those de-
siring access to the facilities, and the listeners and viewers; and in the
balancing of these interests the first amendment interest of the listeners
and viewers is paramount.4" Although there are about four times as
42. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
43. 418 U.S. at 263 (White, J., concurring).
44. See supra note 7.
45. See the quotations in text accompanying notes 20, 25 and 27 supra. In As-
sociated Press v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the application of the Sher-
man Act to press service, over first amendment objections, explaining: "Freedom of
the press from governmental interference under the first amendment does not sanction
repression of that freedom by private interests." 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). In Weaver v.
Jordan, the Supreme Cburt of California held that California's Free Television Act, which
prohibited home subscription television (pay television) was invalid as an abridgement
of free speech and distinguished the NBC case on the ground that the FCC's Chain
Broadcasting Rules (see text accompanying notes 19-22 supra) facilitated rather than
hindered free speech. 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 99 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1966), cert.
denied 385 U.S. 844 (1966).
46. See quotations in text accompanying notes 20, 25 and 27 supra.
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many radio and television stations as there are daily newspapers, con-
centration of control of national and international news and public
affairs programming is far greater in broadcasting than in daily news-
papers. This results from the network-affiliate relationship in television.
Frequent polls show that most Americans depend upon television for
news and information about public affairs. Three commercial television
networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, supply news and public affairs pro-
gramming to three nationwide networks of affiliated stations. The non-
commercial educational broadcasting stations, using the older chain
broadcasting concept, determine the news and, public affairs programs
which will be produced for them by the Public Broadcasting Service.
Most broadcasters limit their news originations substantially to local
affairs. While daily newspapers may receive the AP, UPI, and Reuters
news services, the editors use such portions of this material as they
choose. However, it is impractical for local broadcasters to exercise
any journalistic control or judgment over the news and public affairs
programs provided by networks. If used, the program is broadcast
without editing. Hundreds of local newspaper publishers and editors
determine the content of daily newspapers. Only three commercial
networks determine what national and international news and public
affairs programs the commercial television stations carry. It will be
recalled that the reason why Congress decided to license and regulate
broadcasters was a well-based fear that nationwide broadcasting net-
works could control public opinion and determine the outcome of
political elections.47 The unique concentration in three commercial
networks of control of national and international news, public affairs
programs, and power to manipulate national elections, is the most
dramatic distinction between broadcasting and daily newspapers. This
factor alone justifies the Supreme Court's double standard in appli-
cation of the first amendment to the electronic and print media.4 8
Without contravening freedom of speech or press, Congress could
have adopted a system of use of the publicly owned airwaves under
which stations were common carriers and open mikes were made
available to citizens on a first-come, first-served basis; or Congress
could have divided the broadcasting time on each channel between
hours for commercial broadcasting and hours for noncommercial
broadcast of political campaigns and public issues; or Congress could
47. See text accompanying notes 3-16, section. 1.
48. For an analysis of the constitutional issue in the regulation of cable television,
see Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV: Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience,
61 VA. L. REV. 515 (1975).
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have set apart those hours when children are the most numerous
viewers for broadcast of noncommercial, nonviolent programming de-
signed especially for children. In fact, the FCC, pursuant to authority
conferred by the Congress, allocates portions of the broadcast spectrum
to particular uses. Among these are commercial, noncommercial public
and educational, maritime and aeronautical, government and military,
mobile industrial, and citizen's band uses.49 Such classification pre-
determines the character of broadcasts and excludes from the assigned
frequencies all except the permitted class. However, as this is a reason-
able and necessary system for use of the broadcast spectrum, sucA
regulation does not contravene freedom of speech or press.
The electronic and print media are therefore essentially different,
and the first amendment takes into account the differing nature of the
media.
3. The Governmental Action Issue in the Event of
Repeal of the Equal Opportunities and
Fairness Doctrines
In Section 2 of this article, it was shown that there is a sound con-
stitutional basis for the Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines.
If the Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines were repealed, there
would be a substantial issue whether actions of broadcasters favoring
one candidate against opposing candidates and granting access to ex-
press only one side of the public issues violates the first amendment.
The Supreme Court has established that vesting in private parties
action within the scope of governmental power and responsibility does
not deprive such action of the character of governmental action, if
government is involved in it to a significant degree. In Marsh v. Ala-
bama,5o where a company town had assumed the governmental func-
tions normally exercised by a municipality, management's prevention
of the distribution of religious literature on the business block was
unconstitutional state action. In Terry v. Adams," where the state
permitted a private group to duplicate the state's primary election
process and the regular primary election merely ratified the pre-
primary result, the exclusion of Blacks from the pre-primary process
was state action which violated the fifteenth amendment. And in
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority," where the state provided
49. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970 & Supp. 1974).
50. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
51. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
52. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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a parking facility and leased space therein to a private party for a
restaurant, refusal of the private party to serve a Black because of
his race was held to be state action violating the fourteenth amend-
ment. Justice Clark, for the Court, wrote:
[I]n its lease with Eagle the Authority could have affirmatively re-
quired Eagle to discharge the responsibilities under the Fourteenth
Amendment imposed upon private enterprise as a consequence of
state participation. But no state may effectively abdicate its respon-
sibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge
them whatever the motive may be. . . . By its inaction, the Au-
thority, and through it the State, has not only made iself a party
to the refusal of service, but has elected to place its power, property
and prestige behind the admitted discrimination."
As shown in section 2 of this article, the broadcasting channels
are a public domain owned by the people; the channels are limited
in number and are licensed for a short term, subject to renewal if the
public interest has been served; the licensees of the channels are
trustees and are under an affirmative duty to make a reasonable effort
to ascertain and to fulfill the program needs of the listeners and
viewers; the FCC has been granted power to regulate the licensees
in the public interest; and the first amendment interest of listeners
and viewers in broadcasting has been declared by the Supreme Court
to be paramount in the accommodation of first amendment interests
in broadcasting. Under the regulatory framework of broadcasting
evolved during the past half century, therefore, the federal govern-
ment is involved to a far greater degree than has been held in other
areas to constitute governmental action.
One of the issues in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic National Committee," was whether a broadcaster's refusal to
sell advertising time to groups wishing to purchase advertising time
for the purpose of broadcasting editorial opinions constituted govern-
mental action. Three members of the Court were of the opinion that
the broadcaster's denial of access was not governmental action." They
reasoned that the regulatory framework of broadcasting leaves to the
licensees journalistic freedom in a degree rendering the denial private
action. 56 Two members of the Court were of the contrary view that,
in view of "the public nature of the airwaves, the governmentally
53. Id. at 725.
54. 412 U.S. 94 (1972).
55. Id. at 114-21 (majority opinion by Burger, C. J., joined by Rehnquist, J.).
56. Id. at 117.
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created preferred status of broadcasters, the extensive Government
regulation of broadcast programming, and the specific governmental
approval of the challenged policy," the licensee's refusal to grant access
was governmental action .7 The Supreme Court did not reach a decision
on the governmental action issue.
Two recent federal district court cases support the view that actions
of licensed broadcasters are, in contexts marinated with strong public
interest, governmental action. In Kuzko v. Western Connecticut Broad-
casting Co., 8 a broadcaster's censorship of the political advertisements
of two unsuccessful candidates for public office was held to be govern-
mental action, even though the FCC condemned the censorship.."' In
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 0 it was held that adop-
tion by the networks and National Association of Broadcasters of the
"Family Hour" policy violated the first amendment rights of producers,
writers and actors who wished to create more mature program fare for
network television. The FCC had not participated f3rmally in this
decision, but merely suggested that, unless self-regulation by industry
should ameliorate the problem of sex and violence in programming
during family viewing hours, an administrative policy making proceed-
ing might be initiated. This informal suggestion was held to render the
adoption by the industry of the "Family Hour" policy governmental
action.
Even should the Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines be
repealed, actions by broadcasters granting access to one political can-
didate while denying access to other political candidates and present-
ing only the licensees' point of view on controversial issues of public
importance would raise significant constitutional issues if held to con-
stitute governmental action. In Williams v. Rhodes,61 the Supreme
Court held that state legislation which gives the two major parties an
advantage over minor parties in getting candidates on the ballot vio-
lates equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment and the right of association under the first amendment. In Buckley
v. Valeo,62 the Supreme Court held that The Federal Election Cam-
paign Act,6 3 which favors major parties over minor parties and inde-
57. Id. at 180-81 (dissenting opinion by Brennan, J., with whom Marshall, J.,
concurs).
58. 424 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Conn. 1976).
59. 43 F.C.C. 2d 730 (1974).
60. 423 F. Supp. 1064 (1976).
61. 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
62. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
63. 26 U.S.C. § 6069, §§ 9001-42 (Supp. V 1975).
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pendent candidates, is not invidious discrimination which would violate
the fifth amendment. However, the Court referred with approval to
Congress' recognition that legislation which favored major parties in
such degree that it inhibited the opportunity of minor parties naturally
to become major parties would be unconstitutional .( 4 Similarly, govern-
mental action through licensed broadcasters, which favors major parties
over minor parties to a degree preventing the natural development of
minor parties by granting access to some candidates while denying
access to opposing candidates, would be unconstitutional. As the first
amendment interest of listeners and viewers has been declared by the
Supreme Court to be paramount to the first amendment interest of
broadcasters and networks," governmental action through licensed
broadcasters which grants access for expression of one point of view
on controversial issues of public importance while denying access to
express any other view raises a substantial issue of freedom of speech.
The outcome of constitutional issues under the governmental action
approach is not predictable. The Supreme Court as presently consti-
tuted might hold that actions of licensed broadcasters in limiting access
to favored candidates and viewpoints is not governmental action, but
rather an exercise of journalistic discretion. However, the issue is
substantial and the outcome is in great doubt.
4. The Differential Equality of Access Solution to the
Existing Impracticability of the Equal
Opportunities Doctrine
The Equal Opportunities Doctrine,"' in its present form, is imprac-
ticable. Equal opportunities in use of broadcasting facilities for politi-
cal purposes involves equal time for opposing political candidates
without regard to the substantiality of support by the electorate."1
Candidates of major parties and minor parties, independent candidates,
and candidates in name only, are entitled under the Equal Opportu-
64. 424 U.S. at 96-97.
65. See the quotations in the text accompanying notes 20, 25 and 27 supra. In the
Red Lion case, the Supreme Court emphasized that the first amendment is intended to
"preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas" and not to allow "monopolization of
that market, whether it be by the Government itself or a private licensee." 395 U.S. at
399 (emphasis added). This view of the first amendment lends support to the govern-
mental action basis for holding licensees' presentation of one side of controversial issues
a denial of freedom of speech of listeners and viewers.
66. For a description of the Equal Opportunities Doctrine and its legislative history,
see Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines in Broadcasting: Pillars
in the Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CN. L. REV. 447 (1968).
67. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (Supp. V 1975).
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nities Doctrine to equal treatment by broadcasters in all respects."18
Also, the FCC has interpreted "use" of broadcasting facilities for poli-
tical purposes very broadly, the test being whether the candidate is
identifiable in the broadcast.'"' Even if a candidate appears in a broad-
cast for a purpose unrelated to the candidacy, opposing candidates
are entitled to equal opportunities and may advance their candidacy.70
Prior to 1958, the FCC had held that appearances by political
candidates in newscasts did not constitute a "use"." Then, in the Lar
Daly case, 2 the FCC held that an appearance in a newscast of the
Mayor of Chicago, Richard Daley, greeting the President of Argentina
at a local airport, was a "use" entitling perennial mayoral candidate
Lar Daly to equal time. Congress responded to this broad interpreta-
tion by amending section 315 of the Communications Act of 1934 to
exempt from the Equal Opportunities Doctrine any bona fide news-
cast, bona fide news interview, bona fide news documentary, or on-the-
spot coverage of bona fide news events." These exemptiohs avoided
difficulties which broadcasters otherwise would have encountered in
applying the Equal Opportunities Doctrine.
In 1962, the FCC decided in two cases, Goodwill Station, Inc.74 and
National Broadcasting Co. (Wyckoff), 7 5 that broadcast of debates be-
tween the candidates of the two major parties of a state arranged by
68. The FCC's rulings in applying the Equal Opportunities Doctrine are compiled
from time to time in "primers." Examples are Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates
for Public Office, 23 Fed. Reg. 7817 (1958); 31 Fed. Reg. 6660 (1966); 24 F.C.C. 2d
832 (1970). Also, the FCC has promulgated regulations relating to the Equal Oppor-
tunities Doctrine. 47 C.F.R. § 73.120 (AM), § 73.290 (FM), § 73.590 (Non-commercial
Broadcasting), and § 73.657 (Television) (1976). "Legally qualifed candidate" includes
anyone who qualifes under state law, which includes write-in candidates. "Equal op-
portunities" includes not only equal time but also any other matters affecting the political
efficacy of an appearance. These matters include equal rates and services and a time
period in which a comparable audience may be reached. Licensees are required to keep
public records of the disposition of requests for access by political candidates. Unless
a request for access is made within one week after use by the opposing candidate, the
right lapses.
69. Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 31 Fed. Reg. 6660
(1966); KGN, 40 F.C.C. 293 (1958); Pat Paulsen, 23 RADIO REG. 2d 861 (1972).
If an employee of a station exposed to public view on the broadcast such as a disc jockey
should become a political candidate, opposing candidates would be entitled to equal time.
70. Id.
71. Allen H. Blondy, 14 RADIo REG. 1199 (1957), cited and commented upon in
Use of Broadcast Facilities by Candidates for Public Office, 31 Fed. Reg. 6660, 6663
(1966).
72. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. (Lar Daly), 18 RADIo REc. 238, reconsidera-
tion denied, 26 F.C.C. 717 (1959).
73. Pub. L. 86-274, § 1, 73 Stat. 557 (1959) (amending 47 U.S.C. §,315).
74. 40 F.C.C. 362 (1962).
75. 40 F.C.C. 370 (1962).
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non-broadcast organizations and held outside the studio do not come
within the "bona fide" news exemptions adopted by the Congress and,
hence, opposing candidates were entitled to equal time. The Commis-
sion explained: "Where the appearance of a candidate is designed
by him to serve his own political advantage . . ., such program cannot
be considered to be on-the-spot coverage of a bona fide news event
simply because the broadcaster deems that the candidate's appearance
(or speech) will be of interest to the general public and therefore
newsworthy."7" In 1964, in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,77 the
FCC held that press conferences by candidateg for President, regard-
less of whether the candidate was an incumbent, did not come within
the "bona fide" news exemptions enacted by Congress. The Commis-
sion explained: "[If we were to construe subsection (a) (4) as en-
compassing all coverage of a candidate deemed newsworthy by the
licensee, it would mean that the equal opportunities requirement of
Section 315, in effect, had been repealed - that the licensee, in the
exercise of his good faith news judgment, could cover the speeches,
press conferences, indeed any and all appearances of a candidate,
without bringing into play the equal opportunities requirement."
In a surprising reversal of its interpretations in the foregoing cases,
the FCC, in 1975, in the Aspen Institute case,79 held that broadcasters
may carry broadcasts of debates between political candidates, initiated
by non-broadcast entities outside of broadcast studios, and press con-
ferences, without incurring an obligation to provide equal opportunities
for other candidates for the same office.s0 A divided Court of Appeals
affirmed sub nom. Chisholm v. FCC.8' The litigation in the Aspen
Institute case was scheduled to reach decision in advance of the Presi-
dential election of 1976, as the Aspen Institute put it, to "make the
Bicentennial a model political broadcast year."s' The Presidential de-
bates of 1976 soon followed. Broadcast of the Carter-Ford debates
enabled the electorate to compare the candidates of the Democratic
76. Id. at 372.
77. 40 F.C.C. 395 (1964).
78. Id. at 398.
79. 55 F.C.C. 2d 697 (1975), aff'd sub nom. Chisholm v. FCC, 36 RADiO REG. 2d
1437 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 247 (1976).
80. For an in-depth analysis of the FCC's reinterpretation of the legislative history
of Congress' exemption of "bona fide" news programs from Section 315, and an assess-
ment of the impact of the reinterpretation on the political process, see Barrow, The
Presidential Debates of 1976: Toward a Two Party Political System, 46 U. CN. L. REV.
123 (1977).
81. See supra note 79.
82. 55 F.C.C. 2d at 697.
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and Republican parties, but no opportunity was given the electorate
to compare the candidates of the third and fourth parties. The Bi-
centennial political broadcast model which the Aspen Institute gave
us was a giant step toward establishment of the Democratic and Re-
publican Parties in a political system limited to two parties. Our
Founding Fathers would have rejected the model.
The legislative history of the "bona fide" news exemptions from
the Equal Opportunities Doctrine shows that the purpose of the
amendment was to overrule the FCC's Lar Daly cases3 and that the
exemptions were not to be used to advance the cause of one or more
candidates to the disadvantage of other candidates for the same office.
During the conference of the two houses on the bill which led to the
amendment, Senator Pastore, long-time Chairman of the Senate Sub-
committee on Communications stated: "[A]ll of these programs must
have bona fide news value, and must not be used to advance the cause
of any particular candidate."1
Also, the legislative history shows that Congress considered and
rejected the inclusion of political debates in the exemptions to Section
315. The Communications Subcommittee of the Senate Commerce
Committee considered whether to include debates and panel discus-
sions in the exemptions. It rejected political debates but included panel
discussions in the recommended exemptions, panel discussions being
deemed a lesser inroad on Section 315.1" However, after debate in the
Senate, even panel discussions were excluded from the exemptions. 6
Similarly, the Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce considered
whether to include debates and panel discussions in the exemptions
from Section 315 and refused to include either of them.8
In 1960, Congress suspended Section 315 insofar as it applied to
the Presidential election of 1960. This was done to permit broadcasting
to carry the Kennedy-Nixon debates without having to give equal
time to other Presidential candidates. Congress deemed the suspension
83. See supra note 72. For example, Senator Pastore explained, "Generally all we are
doing is restoring the situation insofar as news is concerned to that which existed for
32 years before the Lar Daly decision." 105 CoNG. REc. 14455 (1959).
84. 105 CONG. REC. 17828 (1959) (remarks of Senator Pastore).
85. S. REP. No. 562, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959); Hearings on S. 1585 before the
Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com-
inerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4, 101-05, 261-62 (1959).
86. 105 CONG. REC. 14453 (1959).
87. H.R. REP. No. 802, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4, 12 (1959); Hearings on H.R. 5389
before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 78-79, 80-82, 87-88, 142, 189 (1959).
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necessary because the "bona fide" news exemptions enacted in 1959
did not include political debates."'
The legislative history supports the FCC's original interpretation
that the "bona fide" news exemptions in Section 315 do not include
political debates and press conferences rather than its reversal of that
interpretation in the Aspen Institute case."" Nevertheless, the reviewing
court, on a two to one vote, affirmed sub nom. Chisholm v. FCC.c0 The
court found the legislative history inconclusive"' and, emphasizing
that its scope of judicial review of FCC action implementing Section
315 is narrower than for judicial review of the usual agency actions,9 2
concluded that it was bound by the FCC's interpretation.93 The dissent,
after a thorough analysis of the legislative history of the 1959 amend-
ments, concluded:
Proper deference to the Commission's expertise cannot insulate this
exercise in administrative arrogation of power from judicial review.
The Commission has not relied on its discretion, nor has it complied
with the procedure designed by Congress to assure that discretion
is wisely used. Instead the Commission has based its reversal of
settled law on a highly selective reading of the legislative history
(italics supplied), the same legislative history it used to establish
the settled law.94
The result of this adjudicatory tour de force is a de facto amendment
of Section 315 to include exemptions which Congress had rejected.
The FCC's exemption of political debates and press conferences
from the Equal Opportunities Doctrine applies to all elections for
public office - federal, state and local. In Presidential elections, and
probably in elections for other political offices, the impact of these
88. Hearings on S. 3171, Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 188, 192, 194, 195-96, 234,
and 272 (1960).
89. See supra note 79.
90. Id.
91. 36 RADIo REG. 2d 1437 at 1447, 1456-57, 1460.
92. Id. at 1448.
93. Id. at 1448, 1457, 1460.
94. Id. at 1505. The statement in the quotation that the FCC did not comply with
the procedure designed by Congress to assure that agency discretion is wisely used
refers to the fact that the FCC reversed its interpretation of twelve years' standing, that
political debates were not included in the "bona fide" news exemptions to Section 315,
in an adjudication rather than in a rule making proceeding. An adjudication does not
provide the opportunity for all interested parties to be heard; a rule making proceeding
does. Using the adjudicatory proceeding in such an important matter deprived minor
parties and the electorate of an adequate opportunity to be heard. The procedure smacks
of a strategy to avoid letting the public know that their fair political process was at stake
in a friendly adjudication.
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exemptions may be great enough to establish permanently the Demo-
cratic and Republican Parties in a two-party political system and to
prevent the natural development of any competing third party.
The influence of network television in Presidential elections is
great. The outcome of primaries and general elections for President
is determined largely by network television coverage. Presidential de-
bates between candidates for the Democratic and Republican Parties
are readily carried by television networks." The famftiliar examples are
the Kennedy-Nixon and Carter-Ford debates. A Presidential debate
between candidates of the Democratic and Republican Parties attracts
a large audience, the prime requisite for network television. Debates
between candidates of minor parties do not attract a large audience.
While a debate between Presidential candidates .of the first through
fourth parties in voter support would attract a substantial audience,
candidates of the Democratic and Republican Parties have nothing
to gain through such a debate and probably would not participate.
Also, the television networks prefer a debate between two candidates
because this form of combat between two knights is better entertain-
ment and captures the popular interest." Hence, the ,effect on the
Presidential election of the FCC's exemption of political debates is
that the Presidential candidates of the Democratic and Republican
Parties will have access to the electorate in free prime time via nation-
wide network television, and the candidates of lesser parties will not.
The FCC's exemption of press conferences from the Equal Oppor-
tunities Doctrine also will favor the Presidential candidates of the
Democratic and Republican Parties over candidates of lesser parties.
Indeed, broadcasters and networks would be able to favor the candi-
date of one of the two great parties without covering the press con-
ferences of the opposing great party's nominee. However, fear of
legislative restoration of press conferences to the coverage of the Equal
Opportunities Doctrine by the victorious party whose candidate was
disfavored probably will prompt evenhanded treatment of the Demo-
cratic and Republican Parties in the matter of coverage of press con-
ferences. But it is unlikely that nationwide networks will cover the
press conferences of Presidential candidates of other parties. 7
95. Hearings .before the Special Subcomm. on Investigations, House Comm. on In-
terstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-27 (1968) (statement of Dr.
Frank Stanton, CBS).
96. Id. at 23.
97. For a more complete analysis of the impact on political elections of the FCC's
exemption of political debates and of press conferences from the Equal Opportunities
Doctrine, see supra note 80 at 132-38.
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The advantage in Presidential elections given the Democratic and
Republican Parties by the FCC's exemption of political debates and
press conferences from the Equal Opportunities Doctrine is aggravated
by the law relating to public financing of Presidential elections.9s
Broadcasters, through coverage of political debates and press confer-
ences, will be able to aid favored candidates to meet the threshold
for matching payments and to increase the size of payments. Parties
electing to accept public funding must observe statutory limitations
on the amount which may be spent in the Presidential election. The
FCC's exemption of political debates and press conferences from the
Equal Opportunities Doctrine enables broadcasters to contribute valu-
able free coverage of debates and press conferences in excess of the
statutory limitation on expenditures.
The FCC's exemption of political debates and press conferences
from the Equal Opportunities Doctrine may give the Democratic and
Republican Parties such a great advantage over other parties that the
natural development of any competing third party is prevented. If so,
applying the governmental action concept described in section 3 of
this article, a substantial constitutional issue will arise when broad-
casters favor candidates of the Democratic and Republican Parties
over candidates of lesser parties through coverage of selected political
debates and press conferences.
Congress should restore Section 315 to the coverage intended by
the Congress when it enacted the "bona fide" news exemptions in 1959.
This should be done by amending Section 315 expressly to provide
that political debates and press conferences are within the coverage
of the Equal Opportunities Doctrine."9
In the current hearings on revision of the Communications Act of
1934, consideration is being given to repealing the Equal Opportunities
Doctrine entirely. 00 This is, in part, a reaction to actions during the
Nixon Administration repressive of the media.01 The specter of thought
98. 26 U.S.C. § 6069, §§ 9001-42 (Supp. V 1975).
99. It is appropriate to except from the Equal Opportunities Doctrine, as the FCC
has long held, press conferences called by a President who is a candidate for reelection
for the purpose of reporting to the people on important matters within the President's
official duties rather than to advance the President's candidacy. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 40 F.C.C. 395 (1964); Republican Nat'l Comm., 40 F.C.C. 408 (1964),
af'd by an equally divided court sub nom. Goldwater v. FCC, No. 18,963 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 893 (1964).
100. See supra note 2.
101. Hearings on Overview of the Office of Telecommunications Policy, Subcomm.
on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 93-2, passim (1973).
85
control by government instills fear of King John and induces trust in
the media barons.102 But President Nixon was forced to resign, Presi-
dent Ford did not engage in such actions, and there is no indication
that President Carter will do so. Nevertheless, we may be on the verge
of substituting unfettered private censorshipoSea for reasonable regula-
tion of broadcasting to fulfill the need of the people to see and hear
all significant political candidates.
Chief Justice Hughes emphasized the importance of maintaining
"the opportunity for free political discussion, to the end that . . .
changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means."' 0 4 The long
range view of our representative democracy must take into account
that a Presidential election process which gives such great advantage
to two established parties that there is no natural opportunity for any
other party to compete will cause citizens who do not belong to either
of the two established parties to seek change outside the normal politi-
cal process. It should be noted that only about half of the eligible
voters participate in national elections. In the 1976 Presidential elec-
tion, favored by perfect weather, only fifty-three percent of the elec-
torate voted. The percentage of the electorate which participates has
been declining for years. This is a dangerous political condition. Our
political process should encourage responsible participation by the
electorate lest some popular demagogue attract the half of the elec-
torate which usually does not vote. Such encouragement can only occur
under a system which permits new parties to develop and to compete
for major status. Television is the political forum today. Unless the
Equal Opportunities Doctrine in broadcasting is retained in a viable
form, the Democratic and Republican Parties will be established in
a political system limited to two parties. The substantial group of
Americans who under a fair political process would express their
views through political parties would then be left no choice except
to express their political ideas outside the political process.
As shown at the beginning of section 4 of this article, the Equal
Opportunities Doctrine is impracticable because the number of candi-
dates for some public offices, including the Presidency, is too great for
102. H. ASHMORE, FEAR IN THE AIR - BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT,
passim (1973).
103. Justice White, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC 395 U.S. 367 (1969), em-
phasized that without the Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines, broadcasters
could exercise "unlimited private censorship" and "unfettered power . . . to communi-
cate only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and to permit on
the air only those with whom they agreed." Id. at 392.
104. DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 352, 365 (1937). Mr. Justice Douglas cited and
paraphrased the statement with approval in Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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broadcasters to give or to sell equal time to all. Public broadcasting
has even greater difficulty than commercial broadcasting in complying
with the Equal Opportunities Doctrine because public broadcasting
cannot sell time to political candidates, and granting free time to one
candidate usually is followed by requests of all opposing candidates
for free equal time. Commercial broadcasters may sell broadcast time
to significant candidates without opposing splinter candidates being
able to buy time. In political campaigns for offices for which numerous
candidates are running, broadcasters and (in the case of the Presi-
dential campaign) networks are reluctant to grant time on either a
commercial or sustaining basis.
A fair solution to the impracticability of the Equal Opportunities
Doctrine is for Congress to enact a principle of differential equality of
access based upon the amount of voter support for the candidate.oa
Candidates would be classified "major", "minor", and "new". The
amount of voter support necessary to qualify as a "major" or "minor"
party candidate should take into account the history of major and
minor parties in the United States. In this century, only six third-party
candidates have received three or more percent of the popular vote.106
Also, in this century, only twelve third-party candidates for President
have received more than one percent and less than three percent of
the popular vote.107
The differential equality of access concept has been enacted by
Congress for application to federal funding of Presidential elections.
Under the Federal Election Campaign Act, 108 for purposes of partici-
pating in the Presidential Election Campaign Fund,109 "major party" is
defined as one whose candidate for President received twenty-five
percent or more of the popular vote in the preceding election, "minor
party" as five percent or more but less than twenty-five percent, and
"new party" as one which does not qualify as a major or minor party.110
105. The author of this article proposed such a plan in 1968. For a more compre-
hensive discussion of the plan and a proposed statute, see supra note 66 at 532-42.
106. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 81-99 (1975); Hearings
on S. 3171, Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1960); R. SCAMMON, AMERICA AT THE POLLS
22, 24 (1965).The six third party candidates receiving three or more percent of the
popular vote in this century are: Theodore Roosevelt in 1912; Eugene Debs in 1912;
Allen Benson in 1916; Eugene Debs in 1920; Robert LaFollette in 1924; and George
Wallace in 1968.
107. Id. For the 1976 election data, in which Eugene McCarthy is shown to have
received about one percent, see NEWSWEEK, Nov. 15, 1976, at 29.
108. 26 U.S.C., § 6069, §§ 9001-42 (Supp. V 1975).
109. 26 U.S.C. § 9001 # (Supp. V 1975).
110. Id. at § 9002.
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The financial support for candidates of such parties varies with the
indicated voter support. Candidates for major parties receive equal
financial contributions; candidates for minor parties receive contribu-
tions based on a ratio of the vote received by the minor party's candi-
date in the preceding election to the average of the votes received by
major party candidates; and, if in the present election, a new candidate
receives five percent or more of the popular vote, a post-election con-
tribution is 'made on the formula applicable to minor party candi-
dates."1 ' This system applied to the Presidential election of 1976. The
system was held constitutional in Buckley v. Valeo."1
The percentiles for qualification as "major", "minor" or "new party
under the legislation for public funding of Presidential elections, dis-
cussed in the preceding paragraph, are higher than should be applied
to the Equal Opportunities Doctrine. Access to broadcasting for poli-
tical purposes should be provided to the extent practicable. Artificial
inducements to the formation of splinter parties may impair the effi-
cacy of the political process. Substantial impediments to the develop-
ment of new parties is certain to impair the viability of the political
process. Indeed, such impediments would be unconstitutional.' 1 If
a standard of five percent for "major" parties and three percent for
"minor" parties should be adopted, in this century there would have
been, exclusive of the Democratic and Republican Parties, only four
major third-party candidates and only two minor third-party candi-
dates. In view of this history, it would seem that, at most, the definition
of "major" party should be ten percent and "minor" party five percent
of the popular vote in the preceding election.
A practicable allocation of broadcast time between "major", "minor"
and "new" parties would be as follows:"14 Upon grant of broadcast
time to a major candidate, opposing major candidates would be entitled
to equal time and opposing minor candidates to half time. Upon grant
of broadcast time to a minor candidate, opposing minor candidates
would be entitled to equal time and opposing major candidates to half
time. The broadcaster could grant time to a new candidate without
being required to grant time to any opposing candidates.
The differential equality of access plan accommodates the various
111. Id. at § 9004.
112. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
113. Id. at 96-97.
114. For suggested., statutory language for such a differential equality of access allo-
cation of broadcast time, see Barrow, supra note 66, at 535-41.
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interests involved in a manner rendering the Equal Opportunities
Doctrine practicable. The electorate needs to see and hear candidates
of major parties for a longer time than other candidates because,
barring a rare political atmosphere, the elected official will come from
one of the major parties. Granting opposing candidates of major parties
equal time satisfies this need. Also, the electorate needs some contact
with candidates of minor parties in order to have an adequate basis
to compare leaderships and platforms. This is particularly important
as to segments of the electorate which deem the major parties too
similar and which feel the need for a new party. Granting candidates
of minor parties half the time which broadcasters grant to candidates
of major parties satisfies this need. Under such a plan, typically broad-
casters would grant time to candidates for major parties, giving minor
candidates a right to half as much time. However, a popular minor
party candidate might well be favored by a number of broadcasters
over either major candidate. Hence, it appears sound to require broad-
casters who grant time to candidates of minor parties to grant half as
much time to candidates of major parties. Again, this fulfills the need
of the electorate for in-depth contact with the major candidates as
one of them probably will be elected. As matters stand, minor parties
rarely have broadcast time. The half time assured minor candidates
would give them an opportunity to develop into major parties, at which
point they would be entitled to equal time. While broadcasters would
not be required to grant time to candidates who do not qualify as
major or minor, broadcasters could grant access to such new candidates
without incurring any obligation to grant time to other candidates.
Thus, such new candidates might be aided in achieving minor party
status. Another balancing procedure in the case of candidates of new
parties might well be access through panel appearances or spot
announcements.
There is no danger that the proposed differential equality of access
solution would create a multiplicity of parties. Our political system
would continue to be essentially a two-party system with a necessary
safety valve.
The differential equality of access solution, if based on reasonable
percentiles of voter support in defining "major", "minor" and "new",
would be constitutional. This is indicated by Buckley v. Valeo 15, in
which the concept was held constitutional applied to the public finan-
115. See text accompanying notes 108-12 supra.
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cing of Presidential campaigns. The solution is also supported by
notable authorities.'1
If the Equal Opportunities Doctrine were repealed, the Demo-
cratic and Republican Parties would be permanently established in
a political system limited to only two competitive parties. Moreover,
the three nationwide commercial networks would have the power to
determine which candidate for the nomination of each party would
be nominated and which of the two nominees would be elected Presi-
dent of the United States. Such concentration of control of the poli-
tical process can be prevented by retaining the Equal Opportunities
Doctrine and rendering the Doctrine practicable by enacting the
differential equality of access principle.
5. Does the Fairness Doctrine Inhibit Broadcast
Journalism?
The policy basis for the Fairness Doctrine was discussed in section
1 and the constitutionality of the Doctrine in section 2 of this article.
In this section, the complaint by some broadcasting officials that the
Fairness Doctrine inhibits broadcast journalism is analyzed.
The basic distinction between representative democracy and au-
thoritarian government is that in a democracy the electorate partici-
pates in political and social decision making. Jefferson believed that the
people, if informed, would make sound decisions.117 H. G. Wells ob-
served that "[h]uman history becomes more and more a race between
education and catastrophe.""" Since 1920, when Wells wrote, the race
has been accelerated greatly by the nuclear age, space exploration, the
population explosion, the energy crisis, and the fouling of the environ-
ment. Our problems grow more complex and time for decision di-
minishes. Many question the capacity of the people to contribute to
decision making. But, if the people do not participate responsibly in
decision making, representative democracy becomes authoritarian.
Moreover, consensus is necessary to support decisions, and it is diffi-
cult to achieve consensus on decisions reached by elites.
Centralization of communications and denial of access to the media
isolate the individual and discourage responsible participation in public
affairs. The ordinary citizen's failure to participate in decision making
116. THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, VOTERS' TIME 20-27 (1971); H. ALEXANDER,
MONEY IN POLITICS 273-74 (1972).
117. C. BOWERS, JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON - THE STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN
AMERICA 108 (1925).
118. H. WELLS, THE OUTLINE OF HISTORY 1198 (1949).
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results substantially from lack of information on the issues. Broadcast-
ing has great power to inform. Polls show that people rely primarily
upon television for news and public affairs information. The accelera-
tion of the race between education and catastrophe requires an
acceleration in the flow of information to the people.
Judge Learned Hand observed that "right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any
kind of authoritarian selection. To many this is, and always will be,
folly; but we have staked upon it our all."Io Justice Holmes wrote that
"the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas....
[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market. ."120 But Justice Holmes's
concept of free trade in ideas presupposes a market to which ideas have
access. Just as the builder of a better mousetrap cannot effectively cry
his wares in the modern industrial market without advertising in the
mass media, the individual with a new idea cannot provide it an op-
portunity to compete for acceptance unless it is aired in the mass media.
The Supreme Court has stated that the purpose of freedom of speech
and press is to assure "the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse and antagonistic sources."'21
Our representative democracy depends upon a multitude of tongues
in the market of ideas to reach sound decisions on crucial issues. The
need of the people to know must be fulfilled by the mass media if the
public is to participate responsibly in decision making and our repre-
sentative democarcy is to retain its vitality as a free society.
The Fairness Doctrine has converted the people's need to know
into a right to know. In its 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcast
Licensees, the FCC stated that licensees, under the Fairness Doctrine,
have an affirmative obligation to devote a reasonable portion of broad-
cast time to the discussion of controversial issues of public importance
and, in the presentation of such issues, must make the broadcasting
facilities available for the expression of contiasting viewpoints. 1 2 2 The
report emphasized that "[i]t is the right of the public to be informed,
rather than any right on the part of Government, any broadcast li-
censee or any individual member of the public to broadcast his own
119. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
120. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (dissenting opinion).
121. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
122. See supra note 11 and related quotation in the text.
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particular views on any matter, which is the foundation stone of the
American system of broadcasting."'22
Officials of the broadcasting industry have long opposed the Fair-
ness Doctrine on the ground that requiring broadcasters to present
contrasting viewpoints inhibits broadcast jounalism.12 4 However, a
survey of broadcasters conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on
Communications in 1968 does not support this contention. Of 5,245
broadcasters answering the questionnaire, 2,768 (53 percent) responded
that the Fairness Doctrine is satisfactory in its present form; 1,183
(22.5 percent) thought the Doctrine would be more satisfactory if
modified or clarified; and only 1,160 (22.3 percent) favored abandon-
ment of the Doctrine.25 Only 488 (9 percent) of the 5,247 broadcasters
answering the questionnaire stated that the Fairness Doctrine discour-
ages broadcast of programs on controversial issues.'12  In the survey,
only 4.3 percent of noncommercial educational licensees wanted the
Fairness Doctrine discarded.'2 7 Also, at the 1968 hearings on the
Fairness Doctrine, witnesses for noncommercial educational broad-
casting testified that the Fairness Doctrine does not inhibit broadcast
journalism.1 28
The contrast between the attitude of some commercial broadcasters
and far fewer noncommercial educational broadcasters suggests that
it is the advertising function of broadcasting, rather than the Fairness
Doctrine, which puts "bleeps in the bellows"12 9 of the broadcasting
lions. Network managers, on behalf of mass-circulation advertisers and
advertising agencies, provide programming which fulfills the advertis-
123. Id.
124. Hearings on the Fairness Doctrine Before the Special Comm. on Investigations
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser.
90-33, at 22-27 (Frank Stanton, CBS); at 39 (Elmer Lower, ABC); at 47-48 (Vincent
T. Wasilewski, NAB); at 77-83 (Reuben Frank, NBC); at 110-15 (Wasilewski, NAB);
at 145-51 (Jay Crouse, RTNDA) (1968). The objections to the Fairness Doctrine were
renewed in, the FCC's 1974 hearing on the Fairness Doctrine. FCC Fairness Doctrine
and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372, 26,374 (1974).
125. Staff Report of Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Communications (Comm. Print
1968) 81.
126. Id. at 82.
127. Id. at 83.
128. See supra note 124 at 102-03 (William G. Harley, NAEB), and at 107 (Lincoln
M. Furber).
129. The colorful phrase was articulated by former Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court Roger J. Traynor, who favors the approach of an informal committee
to investigate complaints against the media. Traynor, Speech Impediments and Hurri-
cane Flo: The Implications of a Right-of-Reply to Newspapers, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 247,
263 (1974).
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ing needs of mass consumer goods.130 Entertainment programs are the
successful vehicles for attracting large audiences to see and hear the
advertisements. Programs involving controversial issues do not create
an atmosphere conducive to strong sales impact. Gresham's Law oper-
ates in broadcasting to drive out public affairs programming and to
bring ,in entertainment programming.
In its 1974 report on the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC wrote relative
to the alleged inhibition of broadcast journalism by the Fairness
Doctrine:
A number of commentators have argued that, in spite of its worthy
purposes, the actual effect of the fairness doctrine can only be to
restrict and inhibit broadcast journalism. Far from inhibiting de-
bate, however, we believe that the doctrine has done much to
expand and enrich it."'
There seems little question that, if the Fairness Doctrine were repealed,
the advertising function of broadcasting would prompt broadcasters
to carry fewer programs 'on controversial public issues.
The policy and procedure of the FCC in administering the Fairness
Doctrine are well calculated to avoid inhibition of broadcast jour-
nalism.132 Broadcasters are not required to present more than one side
of a public issue in the same broadcast. Other points of view may be
presented in the broadcaster's overall program service. Although some
controversial issues have more than two sides or shades of opinion, the
FCC does not require broadcasters to present more than two contrast-
ing viewpoints. Unlike the Equal Opportunities in political broadcast-
ing Doctrine, the Fairness Doctrine does not require that equal time
be given to contrasting viewpoints - only that reasonable time be
given. Decisions as to the controversial issues to be presented, decisions
as to the appropriate spokesmen for such viewpoints, and the format
of the program are "left to the licensee's discretion subject only to a
standard of reasonableness and good faith."'3 3 The FCC does not
130. For the influence of the advertising function of broadcasting on programming,
see Barrow, The Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52 VA. L. REV.
633, 634-44 1966).
131. FCC Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372,
26,374 (1974).
132. The FCC's policies, procedures and adjudications have been fully described
elsewhere and a detailed description is not repeated in this article. See H. GELLER, THE
FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN BROADCASTING (1973); Simmons, The "Unfairness Doctrine" -
Balance and Response Over the Airwaves," 1 COMM/ENT 1 (1977); Barrow supra
note 58, and The Fairness Doctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic and Print Media,
2t6 HASTINGs L.J. 659 (1975).
133. See supra note 131 at 26,374.
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monitor broadcasts for possible violations. Only if a complaint is made
and the complaining party makes a prima facie case does the FCC
forward the complaint to the broadcaster for comment.'3 4 In fiscal year
1973, the FCC received about 2,400 complaints of violations of the
Fairness Doctrine, but it forwarded only 94 of these complaints to the
broadcasters for comment.'13  There are over 8,000 broadcasters and
in the course of a year each of them makes many judgments under the
Fairness Doctrine. Forwarding only 94 complaints may indicate weak
enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine but this certainly could not have
a chilling effect on broadcast journalism.31 In the rare case in which
the FCC finds a violation of the Fairness Doctrine, the licensee need
only provide reasonable time for the opposing point of view in order
to be in compliance." The only context in which a broadcaster is in-
volved in a formal hearing before the FCC on a Fairness Doctrine
matter is where a complaining party has made a prima facie case that
the Doctrine has been violated; the FCC, after giving the broadcaster
an opportunity to comment, is convinced that a violation has occurred
and has requested the broadcaster to broadcast a contrasting view-
point; and the broadcaster has refused to air an opposing viewpoint.
In administering the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC has established
guidelines, promulgated rules to a limited extent, but relied largely
upon case-by-case adjudication.'13 Among the judgments which broad-
casters must make in complying with the Fairness Doctrine are (a)
what specific issue has been raised; (b) whether such issue is a con-
troversial issue of public importance; (c) whether in its overall pro-
gramming the broadcaster has adequately presented this issue; and
(d) whether the broadcaster has afforded a reasonable opportunity
134. Id.; Complaints by Fed'n of Citizen Ass'n, 21 F.C.C. 2d 12 (1969).
135. See supra note 131 at 26,375.
136. Professor Simmons has compiled statistics on Fairness Doctrine complaints for
the years 1973 through 1976 as follows: "If the fiscal years 1973 through 1976 are com-
bined, a total of 49,801 fairness complaints received by the Commission, resulted in 244
station inquiries (.406% of complaints), 54 adverse rulings (.108% of complaints), and
16 general fairness doctrine rulings (.0321% of complaints). In other terms, out of every
1,000 complaints received between FY's 1973 and 1976, approximately four resulted
in station inquiries, one in adverse rulings, and '1/3 of 1' in a general fairness adverse
ruling. The average complainant truly had only a 1 in a 1,000 chance." Simmons, supra
note 132 at 41.
137. See supra note 131 at 26,378.
138. The FCC issues "primers" compiling significant adjudications on Fairness Doc-
trine complaints and providing guidelines. For examples, see 29 Fed. Reg. 10,415 (1964);
40 F.C.C. 2d 598 (1969); 39 Fed. Reg. 26,372 (1974). The only rules promulgated re-
late to personal attacks during broadcast of a controversial issue and political editorials.
47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, .300, .598, .679 (1974).
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in its overall programming for contrasting viewpoints on such issue.139
The FCC has not developed criteria governing these determinations,
preferring to leave such determinations to the journalistic discretion
of the broadcaster, subject to administrative review upon complaint.
Broadcasters serving large communities and having expert management
have little difficulty applying the Fairness Doctrine. However, broad-
casters in small communities and lacking substantial managerial staffs
might well be aided in complying with the Fairness Doctrine by the
FCC's establishing criteria for determinations under the Fairness
Doctrine.o4 0
Professor Simmons in a substantial article in this first issue of
COMM/ENT has described the judgments of broadcasters under the
Fairness Doctrine as very complex and the enforcement of the Fairness
Doctrine by the FCC weak. He has recommended that, in lieu of the
Fairness Doctrine, the FCC adopt a quantitative standard for broad-
casts of news and public affairs programs.' 4 ' The Simmons proposal
has the virtue of simplicity. But a quantitative requirement alone may
not achieve the purpose of the Fairness Doctrine, which is to inform
the public regarding controversial issues of public importance.
Entrepreneurs engage in mass media enterprises not only to make
money but also to shape public opinion and influence political elections.
If broadcasters are subject only to a quantitative requirement, they
may air those issues on which they desire a solution while repressing
issues which are more crucial. In the Patsy Mink case,14 2 a broadcaster
did not carry any broadcasts relating to strip mining although the
community served by the station was destined to be destroyed by the
strip mining of the site on which the community was built. Ordering
the station to comply with the Fairness Doctrine, the FCC wrote, "a
total failure to cover an issue of such extreme importance to the par-
ticular community would raise serious questions concerning whether
the licensee has acted reasonably in fulfilling its obligations under the
fairness doctrine."" Under a quantitative requirement, the broad-
caster would have not been under a duty to carry the controversial
issue.
139. See supra note 131 at 26,376-78.
140. For an insightful study of criteria for selecting issues which merit public airing,
see Mayo, The Free Forum - Development of a Democratic Forum in the, Limited
Media of Mass Communications, 22 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 387 (1954).
141. Simmons, supra note 132.
142. Patsy Mink and 0. D. Hagedorn v. Station WHAR, 59 F.C.C. 2d 987 (1976).
143. Id. at 995.
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Moreover, under a quantitative requirement the broadcaster would
be permitted to limit broadcasts on controversial issues to the viewpoint
of the owner of the station. Justice White, in the Red Lion case, warned
that without the Fairness Doctrine broadcasters could exercise "un-
limited private censorship", would have "unfettered power . . . to com-
municate their own views on public issues", and could exclude from
the airwaves all except "those with whom they agreed."'4 It is difficult
for one having such great power to resist using it. Owners and mana-
gers of networks and broadcasting stations, like the publishers of print
media, occupy the wealthy end of the economic spectrum. If the Fair-
ness Doctrine were repealed, it is likely that the issues ventilated and
points of view aired would represent the private interest of the broad-
casters rather than the public interest. The development of nationwide
networks, with private concentration of control of program content,
which motivated Congress to regulate broadcasting, poses a strong
threat of the control of public opinion unless the Fairness Doctrine
is retained.
Broadcasting's capacity to keep a watchful eye on government is
not diminished by requiring broadcasters to observe the Fairness Doc-
trine. The actions during the Nixon Administration deemed repressive
of the media,14.5 which prompted some citizens to urge deregulation
of broadcasting, were exposed by broadcasting as well as by the print
media.
In our representative democracy, the need of the people to know
should continue to be a right to know. Congress should retain the
Fairness Doctrine.
6. Conclusion
In the current hearings on the Communications Act of 1934, con-
sideration is being given to repeal of the Equal Opportunities and Fair-
ness Doctrines in broadcasting. The Doctrines were adopted because
of concern that nationwide networks of broadcasting stations would
control public opinion and political elections and because it is essential
to representative democracy that the public be informed concerning
vital issues. The Doctrines encourage the public to participate respon-'
sibly in political elections and in decision making.
The Supreme Court has firmly established the constitutionality of
the Doctrines. However, contrary to popular belief, constitutionality
144. 395 U.S. at 393.
145. See supra notes 101-02.
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is not based on scarcity of broadcasting channels alone. An equally
strong basis is that freedom of speech and press in broadcasting re-
quires an accommodation of the first amendment interests of listeners
and viewers, broadcasters, networks, and those desiring access to ex-
press views, and in this balancing of first amendment interests the
interest of the listeners and viewers is paramount. Another important
element in the constitutionality of the regulation of broadcasting serv-
ice in the public interest is that the broadcasting channels are a public
domain, the licensee of the publicly owned channels is granted a
monopoly use of the channel for a limited term, and in exchange for
the valuable free use of the channel the licensee assumes the role of
a trustee of the channel to serve the public interest. A further factor
is that the Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines enhance speech
in the most important area of the public interest. Broadcasting is
uniquely concentrated through three nationwide television networks,
ABC, CBS, and NBC, which provide most of the national and inter-
national news and public affairs programming to the nation. These
three networks, absent the Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines,
could control public opinion on vital issues and determine the election
of the President and other important officials. These several factors
combined account for the constitutionality of the Equal Opportunities
and Fairness Doctrines.
The Supreme Court has established that, if government is involved
in an action to a significant degree, a choice by government officials
to vest in private parties action within the scope of governmental power
and responsibility does not deprive such action of the character of
governmental action. Through the licensing and regulation of broad-
casters in the public interest, the United States is heavily involved in
the actions of broadcasters. This raises a substantial question whether
- if the. Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrines were repealed
and broadcasters then granted access to favored political candidates
while denying access to opposing candidates and broadcast only one
point of view on crucial issues - this would constitute governmental
action violating the first amendment. The decision on the issue is not
predictable, but would be very significant.
The Equal Opportunities Doctrine as presently applied is impracti-
cable. This is because all candidates for political office, regardless of
the substantiality of voter support, are entitled to equal time. There is
not enough broadcast time to grant significant equal time to all candi-
dates. The Equal Opportunities Doctrine can be rendered practicable
by enacting a principle of differential equality of access to broadcasting
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based upon the amount of voter support in the past election or, in the
case of new parties, voter support evidenced by petitions. Parties would
be classified "major", "minor" and "new", as in the case of the public
funding of campaigns by candidates for President. "Major" candidates
would be entitled to equal time, "minor" candidates to half time, and
"new" candidates would not be entitled to time but could be granted
time without incurring ,any obligation to provide time to other can-
didates. The differential equality of access plan accommodates the
need of the electorate for in-depth contact with candidates of "major"
parties, from which the elected official probably will be chosen, the
need of the electorate to be able to compare the leadership and plat-
form of significant "minor" parties with those of the "major" parties,
and the need for a forum within the political system for segments of the
electorate which do not identify with the "major" parties. If the Equal
Opportunities Doctrine were repealed and networks and broadcasters
should grant access only to candidates of "major" parties, as would be
likely, substantial segments of our people would seek change outside
the traditional political system. If the definitions of "major", "minor"
and "new" parties should be based on percentiles of voter support
which so favor the Democratic and Republican Parties that there would
be no opportunity for a third party to evolve naturally and compete
for leadership of the country, the legislation would be unconstitutional.
It is important that all political groups be encouraged to compete for
leadership within the traditional political system. The differential
equality of access modification to the Equal Opportunities Doctrine
would encourage participation by all significant political groups.
In 1975, the FCC, reversing rulings of twelve years standing, held
that the Equal Opportunities Doctrine does not apply to political de-
bates initiated by non-broadcast organizations outside of broadcast
studios or to press conferences. This reinterpretation is contrary to
the intention of the Congress as evidenced by the legislative history
of "bona fide" news exemptions to the Equal Opportunities Doctrine
enacted by Congress in 1959. Particularly in Presidential elections, the
reinterpretation gives the Democratic and Republican Parties a great
advantage over opposing candidates because the national television
networks desire to carry delpates between the Democratic and Re-
publican Presidential candidates but do not provide similar opportun-
ities to Presidential candidates of the third and fourth parties. The
advantage so accruing to the Democratic and Republican Parties is
so great that the natural development of any competing third party
may be prevented. Congress should amend Section 315 to provide that
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political debates and press conferences are within the coverage of the
Equal Opportunities Doctrine.
Spokesmen for organizations within the broadcasting industry con-
tinue to urge that the Fairness Doctrine be repealed on the ground
that it inhibits broadcast journalism. In a poll of all of broadcasting
conducted in 1968 by the Senate Subcommittee on Communications,
however, only nine percent of broadcasters (488 out of 5,247 respond-
ing) stated that the Fairness Doctrine discourages broadcast of pro-
grams on controversial issues. Also, in the FCC's 1974 report on the
Fairness Doctrine, it was concluded that the Doctrine has expanded
and enriched broadcast journalism. In fiscal year 1973, while the FCC
received about 2,400 complaints of violation of the Fairness Doctrine,
only 94 of these complaints were forwarded to broadcasters for com-
ment. In order for a broadcaster to become involved in a formal hearing
on a complaint of violation of the Fairness Doctrine, a complaining
party must make a prima facie case that a violation has occurred, after
receiving comments from the broadcaster the FCC must be convinced
that a violation has occurred, and the broadcaster after request by the
FCC to comply by broadcasting a contrasting viewpoint must have
refused to do so. While enforcement of the Fairness Doctrine may
be weak, the FCC's procedure does not have any chilling effect on
broadcast journalism.
Entrepreneurs engage in broadcasting not only to make money but
also to shape public opinion and influence political elections. If the
Fairness Doctrine were repealed, broadcasters could give undue atten-
tion to some issues while neglecting others. As to any issue broadcast,
the broadcaster could limit the viewpoint to that of the broadcaster.
Broadcasting could become a medium of unfettered private censorship.
It is likely that the issues ventilated and viewpoints expressed would
fulfill the private interest of broadcasters rather than the public interest.
The purpose of the Fairness Doctrine is to inform the people on
vital issues so that they may participate responsibly in representative
democracy. The need of the people to know should continue to be a
right to know through the Fairness Doctrine.
Since the depression of the 1930's, one of the two great political
parties has been deemed more conservative and the other more liberal.
In this century, the daily newspapers, in the great majority, have sup-
ported candidates of the more conservative party. The owners and
managers of newspapers, broadcasting stations and networks share
similar economic, political and social interests. If the Equal Oppor-
tunities and Fairness Doctrines should be repealed, so that licensed
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broadcasters would have the power of unfettered private censorship
enjoyed by newspapers, it may be anticipated that broadcasters and
networks, in the great majority, also would support candidates of the
more conservative party, and that a conservative point of view would
be presented on public issues. Such a concentration of electronic and
print media power could mold the political character of our country
in the conservative form and shift the center of political power. This
may be looked on as a favorable development by conservatives but
may be viewed with alarm by liberals. It would be contrary to the
American tradition which is to hear both sides of public issues and
all significant candidates and then exercise freedom of choice.
